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Abstract Some commentators argue that conception constitutes the onset of human personhood in a metaphysical sense. This
threshold is usually invoked as the basis both for protecting zygotes and embryos from exposure to risks of death in clinical research
and fertility medicine and for objecting to abortion, but it also has consequences for certain religious perspectives, including
Catholicism whose doctrines directly engage questions of personhood and its meanings. Since more human zygotes and embryos
are lost than survive to birth, conferral of personhood on them would mean – for those believing in personal immortality – that
these persons constitute the majority of people living immortally despite having had only the shortest of earthly lives. For those
believing in resurrection, zygotes and embryos would also be restored to physical lives. These outcomes do not mean that concep-
tion cannot function as a metaphysical threshold of personhood, but this interpretation carries costs that others do not. For exam-
ple, treating conception as a moral threshold of respect for human life in general, rather than as a metaphysical threshold of
personhood, would obviate the prospect of the afterlife being populated in the main by persons who have never lived more than
a few hours or days. RBMOnline
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Introduction
Some philosophers treat conception as the threshold of
personhood, as philosopher John Finnis does, by attributing
the capacity to live the life of a human being to all human
organisms after conception: ‘Every living human being has
this radical capacity for participating in the manner of a
person – intelligently and freely – in human goods. That
is, every living being which results from human conception
and has the epigenetic primordia (which hyaditiform moles
and, even more obviously, human sperm and ova lack) of a
human body normal enough to be the bodily basis of some
intellectual act is truly a human being, a human person’
(Finnis, 2000, p. 31). Other commentators (Harris, 1995a,b)
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have criticized this view of personhood, but it persists in
both philosophical and political quarters (Murphy, 2010).
The use of conception as the threshold of personhood is also
sometimes invoked in certain religious traditions as well. In
its 1987 Donum Vitae, the Catholic Church says that after
conception there comes ‘a new life’, ‘the life of a new
human being’, this ‘individual-man with his characteristic
aspects already well determined’, and ‘the biological iden-
tity of a new human being’, among other phrasings. The
authors of Donum Vitae then ask ‘how could a human indi-
vidual not be a person?’ (Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith, 1987, section I.1).
Invoking personhood this way does not mean that the
Catholic Church has formally declared conception to be
the threshold of personhood, as will be discussed, but this
approach to personhood is well worth exploring for its
meaning for the ethics of assisted reproductive treatment,
embryo research and abortion. This threshold also has, how-
ever, implications that might give some of its theological
advocates pause. Among other things, if conception func-
tions as the threshold of personhood, all who come to exist
that way would presumably share the same post-life pros-
pects. The prospect of an afterlife is assumed in many reli-
gions for all persons who achieve adulthood and even for
those who die young, but if conception amounts to the
threshold of personhood, the prospect of an afterlife would
presumptively extend to all who cross that threshold.
Because significant embryo loss occurs in human beings,
the conception threshold of personhood would mean that
human embryos constitute the front ranks of candidates
for the afterlife, as against persons who are actually born.
By itself, this outcome does not falsify the conception
threshold of personhood, but other conceptions of person-
hood do not have to account for the prospect in which
zygotes and embryos would be entitled to resurrected,
immortal life. What follows here will show what the concep-
tion threshold of personhood would mean for certain
religious views of the afterlife and how those outcomes
are avoidable on other accounts of personhood.
Counting persons
Most human zygotes and early embryos do not survive more
than a few hours or days because of genetic anomalies and
developmental problems. Other embryos survive a while
longer but, because of accidents of timing, fail to implant
or are spontaneously aborted. All totalled, some research-
ers estimate that most – meaning more than 50% – in-vivo
human conceptions are lost, which puts human beings who
survive to birth in the minority of all conceived human
beings (Benagiano et al., 2010). Research about the scale
of embryo loss has occurred mostly within the past few
decades, but it would be reasonable to assume that a high
degree of embryo loss has always been the species-typical
way by which human beings have succeeded in having
children. In addition to the embryo loss that occurs during
in-vivo conception, considerable embryo loss occurs in the
course of IVF and other assisted reproductive treatments
because of genetic and developmental difficulties, failures
in implantation, spontaneous abortion and the intentional
disposal of unwanted frozen embryos (No author, 1996). If
the embrace of the afterlife extends to any conceived per-
son, all these lost zygotes and embryos have to be included
in that reckoning.
The US Census Bureau (2012) estimates the total popula-
tion as exceeding 7 billion, an enormous number in its own
right, but it is dwarfed by the number of people who have
ever lived. In 1995, the Population Reference Bureau esti-
mated that 106,456,367,669 human beings have ever been
born, although because of the difficulties involved, its
authors call that number a ‘guesstimate’ (Haub, 1995).
These numbers do not, however, include persons who were
lost as embryos. According to existing estimates of embryo
loss, the 106 billion people who have ever lived would rep-
resent less than half the number of persons ever conceived.
For the sake of the discussion, let us say that that number
represents 49% of human conceptions. If embryo loss has
occurred at the rate of 51% across the history of human
beings, the conception threshold of personhood would mean
that another 115 billion people would have come into exis-
tence but not survived beyond a few days, making the total
number of people who have ever existed as of 1995 in excess
of 221 billion. Millions more people who died in the very ear-
liest stages of life and who survived to birth would have, of
course, come along since 1995.
Invoking conception as the onset of personhood contexts
seems to require the conclusion that the majority of persons
who have ever lived have died within hours or days of com-
ing into existence. In certain religious contexts, invoking
conception as the threshold of personhood seems to mean
that those persons also constitute the majority of people
moving into the afterlife.
After people die
According to some religions, people are immortal from the
point of their creation onward in the sense that their imma-
terial souls never die. Thomas Aquinas (1975b, section 82,
pp. 308–311) made a theological case for immortality on
behalf of the Catholic Church. For example, if embryos are,
in fact, human persons from the point of conception, this
deathless fate would seem to belong to them as well.
According to Catholic teachings, heaven, a transient pur-
gatorial cleansing, or hell are in store for all persons,
depending on their sacramental relationship with God. But
what outcomes could be in store for zygotic or embryonic
human persons who lack the capacity to enter into sacra-
mental relationships? Do the same prospects in the afterlife
exist for these persons just as they exist for an adult who
dies? Over the centuries, Catholic theologians have debated
the fate of infants who die unbaptized (Hart, 2000). Com-
mentators such as Augustine argued that such infants would
– and could only – go to hell because they lacked the
benefit of sacraments necessary for heavenly salvation
(International Theological Commission, 2007, section 16).
Other theologians declined to accept that outcome in light
of their understanding of God‘s nature and revelation
regarding salvation, and some advanced the idea of limbo,
a border place between heaven and hell in which – it was
postulated – unbaptized infants would enjoy the happiness
of the natural order of human life but not the happiness
available to a human being in the supernatural order. Limbo
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was said to encompass ‘the souls of infants who die subject
to original sin and without baptism, and who, therefore,
neither merit the beatific vision, nor yet are subjected to
any punishment, because they are not guilty of any personal
sin’ (International Theological Commission, 2007, introduc-
tion). Some commentators saw limbo, therefore, as a
non-supernatural paradise that protected the link between
Christianity and heaven but without condemning too harshly
those who stood outside Christian sacraments for no failing
of their own (Hardon, 1981, pp. 510–511). On this account,
one might make the case that unbaptized zygotic and
embryonic persons would survive eternally in limbo.
While the idea of limbo was defended by various theolo-
gians, the Catholic Church never adopted the doctrine as a
formal teaching. In 2007, that Church set forth a new
account of what might happen in the afterlife to unbaptized
infants who lack any kind of sacramental relationship with
God. The centrepiece of that account is the position that:
there are theological and liturgical reasons to hope that
infants who die without baptism may be saved and
brought into eternal happiness, even if there is not an
explicit teaching on this question found in Revelation.
However, none of the considerations proposed in this
text to motivate a new approach to the question may
be used to negate the necessity of baptism, nor to delay
the conferral of the sacrament. Rather, there are rea-
sons to hope that God will save these infants precisely
because it was not possible to do for them that what
would have been most desirable – to baptize them in
the faith of the Church and incorporate them visibly into
the Body of Christ (International Theological Commis-
sion, 2007, introduction; emphasis added).
In this way, the Commission defends the proposition that
unbaptized infants might be taken into heaven even if they
have never benefited from the sacraments.
The Commission undertakes this discussion without
defining infants in any way except to contrast them with
adults who can exercise powers of reason (International
Theological Commission, 2007, section 81). Yet the Com-
mission‘s analysis should presumably apply to any
conceived person, and its own discussions shows as much.
Referring to the rise in the number of unbaptized infants,
the Commission says that ‘In these times, the number of
infants who die unbaptized is growing greatly. This is partly
because of parents, influenced by cultural relativism and
religious pluralism, who are non-practising, but it is also
partly a consequence of in-vitro fertilization and abortion’
(International Theological Commission, 2007, section 2).
The Commission here treats IVF embryos as among the
unbaptized, namely as human persons eligible for baptism
(Hart, 2000). Against this background, it is therefore diffi-
cult to see how the rationale that opens heaven to unbap-
tized infants would not also apply to any conceived person,
regardless of the state of development and regardless of
whether conceived in vitro or in vivo. Embryos would, of
course, be no more capable of incurring any personal sin
than newborns, and for that reason the stance of hoping
for their salvation is plausible despite their standing
outside the circle of the baptized.
One way to avoid having an afterlife populated
primarily by persons who knew only zygotic or embryonic
life is to argue that the sheer scale of embryo loss means
that conception cannot be the threshold of human person-
hood. Benagiano et al. (2011) address this viewpoint, but
they are unimpressed with the scale of embryonic mortal-
ity. They point out that fatality is necessarily part of what
it means to be human. If the facts of embryo loss are
correct, it may seem odd that most people die just hours
and days into their lives, but as these commentators
correctly note there is nothing about this view that means
those early human organisms cannot be persons since
nothing about the status of personhood shields anyone
from death.
The Catholic Church has not formally declared the per-
sonhood of zygotes and embryos as a matter of formal reli-
gious teaching (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
1987, section I.1). The consequences that have been
sketched above would, however, apply to any religious
views that do treat conception as the threshold of person-
hood. If we take the rhetorical gestures (quoted in the first
paragraph of this article) that this church makes toward the
personhood of these human organisms, it makes sense to
think through the consequences of invoking personhood at
conception for the afterlife.
An aside on bodily resurrection
Not only do some religions such as Catholicism maintain the
immortality of persons, they maintain that people in the
afterlife will exist bodily, being rejoined in body to their
immaterial souls at somepoint. For example, Aquinas (1975b,
section 79, pp. 297–300) defended the prospect of bodily res-
urrection and also speculated about the age of the body in the
afterlife, and he concluded: ‘But all must rise at the age of
Christ, which is that of youth, by reason of the perfection
of nature which is found in that age alone. For the age of boy-
hood has not yet achieved the perfection of nature through
increase; and by decrease old age has already withdrawn
from that perfection’ (Aquinas, 1975b, section 88, p. 329).
On this account, human bodies will be restored at a point at
which they are neither still maturing nor starting to decline.
In the afterlife, people who died in their eighties or nineties
would presumably have the clock set back towhatever consti-
tutes the exact midpoint between the ‘increase’ and
‘decrease’ of age. People who die very young would presum-
ably have the clock set forward to that midpoint. For people
who never survived beyond the zygotic or embryonic state,
resurrection would entail not a restoration of their biological
maturity but a conferral of a biological maturity they never
had.
Some philosophical schools of thought maintain that
human beings are socially constituted in their personhood,
namely that human personhood consists not only in
bodies but in social experiences: human persons are not
independent givens but are only ever socially constituted
(Rasmussen, 2008). If we are persons only in that way, zygotic
and embryonic persons would necessarily lack that funda-
mental feature of personhood as they enter the afterlife;
they would be non-individuated by social experiences. In
thinking through the nature of the afterlife, one would also
have to ask how this component of human individuation could
be accounted for, if at all.
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The formidable amount of effort required to restore old
bodies to their age of perfection and to advance immature
bodies to their age of perfection – with whatever individu-
ated traits they may have – does not throw the possibility of
bodily resurrection into unrecoverable doubt. If one is will-
ing to accept a religious view that immaterial souls can sur-
vive bodily death, that bodies can be resurrected and that
re-embodied human beings live eternally, one is already
conceding unimaginable divine power. After concessions
like these, there is no reason to think God could not confer
bodily maturity or individuation on a person who was never
anything more than a single cell or on an embryo which was
never more than a cluster of cells. The relevant point here is
not the specific bodily form which human zygotes and
embryos might assume in the afterlife but that bodily resur-
rection for these early forms of human life would be
entailed for religious views that treat conception as the
threshold of personhood.
Personhood at conception: what kind of
threshold?
Various commentators have argued that the personhood of
an organism depends on properties other than conception
or even biological humanness, such having as a minimal
grade of sentience (Borlotti and Harris, 2005). Working
within religious traditions, some commentators have argued
that ensoulment may be necessary to personhood, with
some commentators saying that ensoulment cannot take
place until at least some biological maturation occurs
beyond the zygotic phase (Ford, 1988, pp. 40, 60–61). For
example, Aquinas held that ensoulment of the human
embryo took place after a period of embryonic development
(Aquinas, 1975a, section 89.11, p. 304; Ford, 1988, pp.
xiv–xv). This kind of account, known as mediate ensoul-
ment or mediate hominization, as against immediate
ensoulment, offers a developmental space in which human
organisms may not yet be human persons properly speaking.
As mentioned, the Vatican specifies in its 1987 Donum
Vitae that it has not formally declared the personhood of
zygotes in a philosophical way. Despite that demurral, the
Congregation declares nevertheless that the humanity in
question should be protected from death so far as possible.
The difference here is that – despite some rhetorical ges-
tures in the direction of personhood – the Vatican looks to
conception not as a threshold of metaphysical personhood
but as a moral threshold that triggers certain kinds of respect
even if no persons properly speaking are involved. The
Church returned to this kind of moral interpretation of con-
ception in Dignitas Personae (2008), when its Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith declared that:
It is appropriate to recall the fundamental ethical crite-
rion expressed in the Instruction Donum Vitae in order to
evaluate all moral questions which relate to procedures
involving the human embryo: ‘Thus the fruit of human
generation, from the first moment of its existence, that
is to say, from the moment the zygote has formed,
demands the unconditional respect that is morally due
to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality.
The human being is to be respected and treated as a
person from the moment of conception; and therefore
from that same moment his rights as a person must be
recognized, among which in the first place is the
inviolable right of every innocent human being to life’
(Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 2008;
emphasis in the original).
Here again, the Congregation declares that respect and
treatment as a person is owed from the moment of concep-
tion, which is not the same as saying that conception
amounts to the metaphysical creation of a person properly
speaking or that respect is owed on the basis of personhood
alone. This commitment to respect toward early stages of
human life grows out of the status of zygotes and fetuses
in the divinely ordained generation of human life and the
meaning of marriage (Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, 1987, sections I.4 and I.5). In this sense, the respect
owed human zygotes, embryos and fetuses is owed indepen-
dently of personhood properly speaking.
If zygotes and very early embryos are not persons, theolo-
gians do not have to puzzle about the fate of those persons
who are entrained by their genetics and developmental diffi-
culties to almost immediate death. On this interpretation,
the death of zygotes and early embryos would be unfortu-
nate, but not the mournful event that is the death of persons
and not either something of immortal consequence. How-
ever, the question of an afterlife does apply after any point
at which theologians or other commentators interpret
embryos as human persons. However many of them there
might be, what fate awaits them?
Conclusions
A very strange heaven is part of the cost of treating concep-
tion as a threshold of personhood, for those who couple that
idea with the idea of immortal, resurrected life. By treating
conception as the onset of personhood, the afterlife would
be mostly peopled by human beings who in their earthly his-
tories never said a word, never took a step and never had
anything but a biotic relationship with another human
being, let alone known God or religion in any recognizable
way. This account of persons and their afterlives is intelligi-
ble as an eschatology, namely as an account of final events
in human lives and the world, but it means that the majority
of people who enter the afterlife would do so as people who
have lived for only a very short time.
By contrast, if the threshold of personhood comes at
some point after conception, zygotes and embryos that die
early on would presumably not be presumed to have an
afterlife. Nothing about this latter approach to personhood
is incompatible with the argument – for those who want to
make it – that moral respect is owed to human zygotes
and embryos because of their status in the generation of
human beings. Nothing about this alternate interpretation
of personhood would mean either that theologians could
not hope for heaven on behalf of human persons who die very
young. Alternate conceptions of personhood do mean, how-
ever, that questions about the entitlement of zygotes and
embryos to resurrection and immortality would be moot,
and in that regard they are more parsimonious in accounting
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